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ABSTRACT
It is important to study the risks of publishing privacy-sensitive
data. Even if sensitive identities (e.g., name, social security number)
were removed and advanced data perturbation techniques were
applied, several de-anonymization attacks have been proposed to
re-identify individuals. However, existing attacks have some limi-
tations: 1) they are limited in de-anonymization accuracy; 2) they
require prior seed knowledge and suffer from the imprecision of
such seed information.
We propose a novel structure-based de-anonymization attack,
which does not require the attacker to have prior information (e.g.,
seeds). Our attack is based on two key insights: using multi-hop
neighborhood information, and optimizing the process of de-anonymization
by exploiting enhanced machine learning techniques. The experi-
mental results demonstrate that our method is robust to data per-
turbations and significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art de-
anonymization techniques by up to 10× improvement.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Privacy-sensitive data (social relationships, mobility traces, medi-
cal records, etc.) are increasingly becoming public to facilitate data-
mining researchers and applications. To protect users’ privacy, data
anonymization techniques have been the focus of extensive inves-
tigations [7, 15, 22].
Most privacy-sensitive data are closely related to individual be-
havior, and thus contain rich structural/graph-theoretic character-
istics. For example, social networks can be modeled as graphs in
a straightforward manner. Mobility traces can also be modeled
as graph topologies [25]. However, even equipped with sophisti-
cated anonymization techniques [4, 13, 14], the privacy of struc-
tural data still suffers from de-anonymization attacks assuming
that the adversaries have access to rich auxiliary information (also
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called background information) from other channels [1, 2, 6, 8–
12, 15, 17, 18, 20, 25].
Today, many individuals have accounts in various social net-
works such as Facebook, Twitter, Google+, Myspace and Flickr.
Based on the inherent cross-site correlations, Narayanan et al. [18]
effectively de-anonymized a Twitter dataset by utilizing a Flickr
dataset as auxiliary information. Furthermore, Nilizadeh et al. [20]
exploited the community structure of a graph to de-anonymize so-
cial networks. Other public datasets may also contain individual
behavior information. For instance, Srivatsa et al. [25] proposed to
de-anonymize a set of location traces based on a social network.
They demonstrated that a contact graph identifying meetings be-
tween anonymized users in the location traces can be structurally
correlated with the corresponding social network graph.
However, previous work on de-anonymization attacks have sev-
eral limitations: 1) most previous works [17, 18, 20] rely on a seed-
identification process. To obtain the useful seeds, they assume that
the attacker possesses detailed information about a small number
of members of the target network. They also assume that the at-
tacker can determine if these members are also present in his aux-
iliary network (e.g., by matching user names and other contextual
information). Furthermore, these methods may suffer from the im-
precision of the adversary’s background knowledge (misidentified
seeds); 2) existing seed-free de-anonymization techniques [8, 21]
have limited accuracy because they only utilize limited structural
information of the data. In this paper, we aim to solve these prob-
lems by proposing a novel blind (i.e., seed-free) de-anonymization
technique and exploring fine-grained structure information of graph
topologies. Overall, we make the following contributions:
• Wepresent a novel de-anonymization technique, which does not
require adversaries to have any prior information (e.g., seeds).
In our method, 1) we propose the nK-series to incorporate multi-
hop neighbors’ information in graph structures as novel features
in our de-anonymization attack; 2)we jointly optimize thematch-
ing for users between the anonymized graph and the auxiliary
graph by leveraging a machine learning technique: pseudo rele-
vance feedback support vector machine (PRF-SVM).
• We show that our method is practical and effective: our attack is
robust to data perturbations and has significant de-anonymization
advantages over existing approaches with up to 10× improve-
ment. Our method demonstrates that structural data can be ef-
fectively de-anonymized even without any seed information.
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Figure 1: Mechanism for our blind de-anonymization attack.
2 BLIND DE-ANONYMIZATION ATTACKS
Previous works on structure-based de-anonymization do not fully
utilize fine-grained graph-theoretic information. For instance, only
one-hop neighbors have been utilized in [17], and very limited
structural information has been leveraged in [8]. Also, most exist-
ing work rely on assumptions that the adversary has prior informa-
tion or some ground truth (e.g., the seed information in [18]). How-
ever, seed-based de-anonymization attacks have some issues in
practice: 1) the seed identification process usually requires heavy
computational complexity [18]; 2) misidentified seeds may seri-
ously decrease the de-anonymization capability.
We propose a general, blind (seed-free) de-anonymization at-
tack. Figure 1 outlines our method, which consists of the following
key steps on each of the anonymized graph,Ga , and the auxiliary
graph, Gu . Our proposed nK-series aims to capture fine-grained
structural information of each node, and the PRF-SVM aims to
jointly de-anonymize the nodes. By exploring richer and finer-grained
structural information of the graphs, our method can achieve bet-
ter de-anonymization performance without requiring the adver-
saries to have any prior information (e.g., seeds).
Step1:Wefirst exploremulti-hopneighbor information by propos-
ing our new nK-series structural features for each node.
nK-series: Inspired by the idea of the dK-series [16] for charac-
terizing structural statistics of a graph, we propose the nK-series to
describe structural features of each node in a fine-grained manner,
by incorporating the structural information of its multi-hop neigh-
bors. nK0 represents the degree of the node, i.e., the number of its
neighbors. nK1 captures the degree histogram of its neighbors and
nK2 captures the degree histogram of its 2-hop neighbors. Here,
we focus our research on nK0, nK1, and nK2 to construct the nK
structural features of each nodea as v(a) = [nK0(a),nK1(a),nK2(a)]T .
Step 2: Based on the nK structural features, we calculate the di-
versity score for each node a, which measures the richness of the
structural characteristics of this node and is defined as DS(a) =∑
i v˜i (a) log v˜i (a)
log(dim(v˜(a)))
. where v˜(a) denotes the normalized structural fea-
ture vector of a, i.e., v˜(a) =
v(a)
‖v(a) ‖2
. dim(v˜(a)) denotes the dimen-
sion for v˜(a). Here,
∑
i v˜i (a) log v˜i (a) is actually similar to entropy
in information theory [3], which evaluates the amount of infor-
mation stored in v˜i (a), and log(dim(v˜(a))) is just for normalizing
the diversity score so that DS(a) ∈ [0, 1]. A higher diversity score
means that this node has more distinguishable structural charac-
teristics.
Next, we start de-anonymizing the anonymized data in an iter-
ative manner.
Step 3: For each round, we calculate the popularity score for
each node, which evaluates its relationships with the set of de-
anonymized nodes in the previous round (the set of de-anonymized
nodes is empty in the initial round). We denote N t as the set of
nodes that have been de-anonymized after the t-th iteration, where
N t is an empty set for the first round. We define the popularity
score of node a, PS(a), as the Jaccard similarity [24] between the
set of neighbors N (a) for each node a and N t as:
PS(a) = J (N t ,N (a)) = |N t ∩ N (a)|/|N t ∪ N (a)| (1)
where J (A,B) is the Jaccard similarity, J (A,B) =
|A∩B |
|A∪B |
, and PS(a) ∈
[0, 1]. A higher popularity score represents a closer relationship be-
tween this anonymized node and those previously de-anonymized
nodes. In addition to the diversity score, the popularity score can
also be leveraged to evaluate the structural characteristics of each
anonymized node.
Step 4: Subsequently, we compute the structure score (SS) for
each node a as SS(a) = DS(a) + c · PS(a). where c is a pre-defined
parameter to balance the diversity score and the popularity score.
Step 5: Next, we group the nodes in the anonymized graph
and the auxiliary graph according to their structure scores. Our
grouping process works as follows: for the t-th iteration, we se-
lect Nдroup nodes with higher SS from the anonymized graph and
the auxiliary graph to form the group pairCta (for the anonymized
graph) and Ctu (for the auxiliary graph). Note that for the first iter-
ation, we select those nodes with higher DS (since PS = 0 for the
initial round).
Step6: For each group pair, we rank each potential pair of nodes
according to the similarities between their nK structural features.
For each node a inCta and node b inC
t
u , we evaluate the similar-
ity between their nK structural features by computing the cosine
similarity [5] between v(a) and v(b) as Sim(a,b) =
〈v(a),v(b )〉
‖v(a) ‖2 ‖v(b ) ‖2
.
Larger cosine similarity score means two nodes are more similar.
Furthermore, to emphasize the differences between node pairs and
thus to improve the nodematching performance, we can transform
the above similarity linearly as
S(a,b) = max
d ∈C tu
(Sim(a,d)) −
max
d ∈C tu
(Sim(a,d)) − Sim(a,b)
var (Sim(a, :))
(2)
where Sim(a, :) is a vector consisting of Sim(a,d) for d ∈ Ctu and
var(·) is the variance of a vector.
Step 7: Next, we leverage machine learning techniques: pseudo
relevance feedback with support vector machine (PRF-SVM), to re-
rank these potential pairs of nodes.
Specifically, we view this node-matching process from a classi-
fication perspective, i.e., we aim to classify all the possible pairs
of nodes as two categories: matched or unmatched. For each SVM
iteration, we select the top Ntr ain node pairs with the highest sim-
ilarity scores and the bottom Ntr ain node pairs with the lowest
similarity scores as the training data, labeling them asmatched and
unmatched, respectively.
With these training node pairs, we apply SVM to classify the
remaining node pairs. The SVM method would result in a classifi-
cation hyperplane. Based on this hyperplane, each possible node
pair would be given a value dis(a,b) derived according to its dis-
tance from the hyperplane. We define a confidence score SVM(a,b)
for each potential node pair (a,b), which is linearly normalized as
SVM(a,b) =
|dis(a,b ) |−dmin
dmax−dmin
, where dmax ,dmin represent the max-
imum and minimum distance from the hyperplane computed over
all the remaining node pairs. The updated similarity score Sˆ(a,b) is
obtained by integrating the original similarity score S(a,b) in Eq. 2
with the confidence score SVM(a,b) as
Sˆ(a,b) = S(a,b) · SVM(a,b)α (3)
where α is a parameter that emphasizes the importance of the con-
fidence score SVM(a,b) in Eq. 3. A new ranking list is thus gener-
ated based on these updated similarity scores, Sˆ(a,b). This process
of classification and re-ranking can be conducted iteratively until
a stable classification result is obtained.
Step 8: Finally, we extract the matched pairs of nodes based on
the classification result of PRF-SVM in Step 7 and then update the
set of de-anonymized nodes N t . We iteratively repeat Step 3-Step
7 until we cannot de-anonymize any more nodes.
Note that although our method is seed-free, it can be directly
generalized to incorporate seed knowledge if the adversary has
such prior information. Given a set of known seeds, these seeds
could be considered as the matched result in the first group of our
algorithm, and the iteration for finding more matched nodes can
be implemented consequently as shown in Figure 1.
3 EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
In this section, we compare our attack with the state-of-the-art de-
anonymization techniques [8, 20], to show the significant advan-
tage of our approach (up to 10× improvement in de-anonymization
accuracy). For fair comparison, we use the default parameters in
the code these authors provided or the optimal parameters they uti-
lized in their papers. We experiment on the collaboration dataset,
the Twitter dataset and the Gowalla dataset (discussed below) for
fair comparison with the method of Ji et al. and the method of
Nilizadeh et al. since these are also the datasets they utilized [8, 20].
3.1 Datasets and General Settings
The Collaboration dataset [19] is a network of co-authorships be-
tween scientists who have posted preprints on the Condensed Mat-
ter E-Print Archive, which consists of 36,458 users and 171,735 edges.
The Twitter dataset [20] captures the connections between users
who mentioned each other at least once between March 24th, 2012
and April 25th, 2012, and contains two different graphs named
Twitter (small) with 9,745 users and 50,164 edges, and Twitter (large)
with 90,331 users and 358,422 edges.
The Gowalla dataset consists of a social graph and a mobility
trace dataset [23]. The social graph contains 196,591 users with
950,327 edges. The mobility trace consists of 6.44M checkins gen-
erated by these users. To better evaluate the performance of our
method,we leverage the techniques in [23] to construct four graphs
from the mobility trace dataset with different recalls and preci-
sions, denoted by M1, M2, M3, and M4. All the four mobility trace
graphs contain 196,591 users, and the corresponding number of
edges are 659,186, 829,375, 919,671, 1,070,790, respectively.
To evaluate the performance of our de-anonymization attack,
we consider a popular perturbationmethod of Hay et al. [7], which
applies a sequence of r random edge deletions followed by r ran-
dom edge insertions (a similar perturbation process has been uti-
lized for the de-anonymization attacks in [20]). Here, we define
noise (perturbations) as the extent of edge modification, i.e., the ra-
tio of altered edges r to the total number of edgesM , i.e., noise = rM .
Note that we add the same amount of noise to the original graph
of the Collaboration, Twitter datasets to obtain the anonymized
graph and the auxiliary graph, respectively. For Gowalla mobility
trace, we utilize its social network structure for de-anonymization
attacks. Furthermore, we vary the system parameters of ourmethod
and set c = 2,Nдroup = 1000,Ntr ain = 1250,α = 1 for achieving
the best performance in our experiments.
We utilize Accuracy to evaluate the de-anonymization perfor-
mance. Accuracy is the ratio of the correctly de-anonymized nodes
out of all the overlapped nodes between the anonymized graph and
the auxiliary graph, i.e., Accuracy = Ncor
|Va∩Vu |
, where Ncor is the
number of correctly de-anonymized nodes and Va ,Vu represent
the sets of nodes in the anonymized and auxiliary graph, respec-
tively.
3.2 Comparison with Ji et al. [8]
Ji et al. [8] proposed a cold-start optimization-based de-anonymization
attack. Although they utilized four structural attributes for each
node: degree, 1-hop neighborhood, top-K reference distance and
sampling closeness centrality, these attributes only represent coarse-
grained structure information of the graphs.
We compare our approach with the method of Ji et al. in the
Collaboration dataset, the Twitter dataset and the Gowalla dataset
in Figure 2. We can see that our approach has much higher accu-
racy than their method: we can achieve up to 10× improvement
for collaboration dataset, and about 6× improvement for two Twit-
ter graphs. Furthermore, we utilize the Gowalla social dataset to
de-anonymize the Gowalla mobility trace dataset, in order to com-
pare with the method of Ji et al. for fairness (they experimented
on this data in [8]). In Figure 2(d), the de-anonymization results of
our method for Gowalla mobility trace datasets (M1)(M2)(M3)(M4)
are 81.3%, 84.8%, 85.3% and 89.1%, respectively. By utilizing finer-
grained and richer structural information, our method also outper-
forms the method of Ji et al. for the Gowalla dataset.
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Figure 2: The comparison of our approach with the method of Ji et al. [8].
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Figure 3: The comparison of our approach with the method of Nilizadeh et al. [20].
3.3 Comparison with Nilizadeh et al. [20]
Nilizadeh et al. [20] leveraged community detection techniques to
partition the networks into separate components. Then, they ap-
plied existing network alignment methods to the nodes inside the
communities formore seed knowledge. However, their method has
the following limitations: 1) it requires prior knowledge (seeds) to
boot up their attack, which is a strong assumption and may suf-
fer from misidentified seeds; 2) their performance may be influ-
enced by the inconsistency problem of community detection meth-
ods [26]. We experiment on the collaboration dataset and the two
Twitter graphs for fair comparison with the method of Nilizadeh
et al. since these are also the data they used in [20].
Figure 3(a) compares ourmethodwith the approach of Nilizadeh
et al. on the collaboration dataset. Our method can de-anonymize
much more authors and is also more stable to data perturbations.
For noise = 0.4, our method significantly outperforms the method
of Nilizadeth et al. by more than 10× for de-anonymization accu-
racy.
Figure 3(b) and 3(c) compare our method with the method of
Nilizadeh et al. on the Twitter datasets. Our method is more robust
to noise, and has higher accuracy especially when the noise is high.
For noise = 0.4, we have almost 1.25× improvement for Twitter
(small) dataset, and 9× improvement for Twitter (large) dataset.
4 CONCLUSION
We presented a novel blind (seed-free) de-anonymization method
by utilizing the nK-series that we define to capture fine-grained
structure features, and proposing a new variant of the SVM ma-
chine learning technique called PRF-SVM to do concurrent match-
ing of the nodes between the anonymized graph and the auxil-
iary graph. Experimental results demonstrate the significant ad-
vantages (up to 10× improvement in de-anonymization accuracy)
of our method over the state-of-the-art de-anonymization attacks.
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